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Abstract
In the United States, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate of promoting stable inﬂation and
maximum employment. Since the Fed directly controls only one instrument—the federal funds
rate—the authors argue that the Fed’s priorities continuously alternate between inﬂation and
economic activity. In this paper, the authors assume that the effective weights put by the Fed on
different indicators vary over time. To test this assumption, they estimate a monetary policy
priority index by adding non-linear endogenous weights to a conventional Taylor-type rule.
In a departure from the existing literature, the authors do not try to distinguish between long-
lasting monetary policy regimes. Instead, their model allows the Fed’s priorities to vary
continuously. It is therefore possible to assess the Fed’s priorities at any given time during the
Greenspan era. Further, the authors’ non-linear reaction function speciﬁcation allows the Fed to
react more agressively to inﬂation the more expected inﬂation diverges from an implicit target.
The speciﬁcation takes into account the accepted idea that the Fed’s inﬂation mandate ultimately
prevails over its economic activity mandate.
The authors’ results are intuitive and corroborated by historical evidence. Indeed, the monetary
policy indexes show that the Fed’s focus was mainly on inﬂation over the ﬁrst 10 years of
Greenspan’s term as Fed chairman. Then, around 1998, economic activity became the Fed’s main
focus. This is consistent with the gain in the Fed’s credibility over the Greenspan era.
JEL classiﬁcation: C22, C52, E52
Bank classiﬁcation: Monetary policy framework; Monetary policy implementation; Econometric
and statistical methods
Résumé
Aux États-Unis, la Réserve fédérale a le double mandat de promouvoir la stabilité de l’inﬂation et
un niveau d’emploi maximal. Comme elle ne contrôle directement qu’un instrument — le taux
des fonds fédéraux —, les auteurs soutiennent que ses priorités oscillent constamment entre deux
pôles : l’inﬂation et l’activité économique. Ils postulent en conséquence que l’importance relative
effectivement accordée par la Réserve fédérale aux différents indicateurs varie au ﬁl du temps.
Pour tester cette hypothèse, ils estiment un indice des priorités de la politique monétaire en
intégrant à une règle de Taylor classique des pondérations endogènes non linéaires.
Rompant avec la pratique de leurs prédécesseurs, les auteurs ne cherchent pas à dégager les
orientations de la politique monétaire à long terme, mais formulent un modèle dans lequel lesvi
priorités de la Réserve fédérale peuvent varier de façon continue. De la sorte, il devient possible
d’évaluer à tout moment ce qu’ont été les priorités de l’institution sous la houlette de Greenspan.
En outre, la fonction de réaction non linéaire retenue par les auteurs permet à la Réserve fédérale
de réagir à l’inﬂation avec d’autant plus de force que le taux d’inﬂation attendu s’écarte d’une
cible implicite. Sa forme traduit l’idée admise que la lutte contre l’inﬂation prime en ﬁn de
compte sur la promotion de l’activité économique dans le double mandat de l’institution.
Les résultats obtenus sont intuitifs et corroborés par les données historiques. Comme le montre
bien l’indice des priorités mis au point, la Réserve fédérale s’est surtout préoccupée de l’inﬂation
durant la première décennie de la présidence de Greenspan, puis elle a tourné davantage son
attention vers l’activité économique aux alentours de 1998. Cette évolution concorde avec
l’amélioration de la crédibilité de l’institution durant l’ère Greenspan.
Classiﬁcation JEL : C22, C52, E52
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire; Mise en œuvre de la politique
monétaire; Méthodes économétriques et statistiques  1 
1.  Introduction 
 
Economists and financial analysts are interested in estimating the reaction function (the 
central bank’s  response to economic developments), since it allows them to forecast 
policy decisions on the  interest rate,  estimate  forward-looking  macro models,  and 
evaluate policy actions. Estimating a reaction function over history  can also reveal the 
weights that a central bank put on a given objective when taking policy actions during a 
given period. In this paper, we estimate the priorities of the U.S. Federal Reserve and 
their evolution through the Greenspan era. 
 
The Federal Reserve has a dual  mandate of  promoting  stable inflation and  maximum 
employment. Since the Fed  directly  controls only one instrument—the federal funds 
rate—we  argue  that the  Fed’s priorities  continuously  alternate between inflation  and 
economic activity.  Barring  adverse supply shocks, these two goals are  usually  not in 
conflict with each other, which facilitates monetary policy implementation.  
 
In this paper, we assume that the effective weights put by the Fed on different indicators 
vary over time. To test this assumption, we estimate a monetary policy priority index by 
adding  non-linear endogenous weights  to a conventional  Taylor-type rule.  These 
endogenous weights vary between 0 and 1, depending on whether the Federal Reserve 
puts more or less weight on a given indicator. As in most Taylor-type reaction functions, 
inflation and the output gap are the two main indicators considered. Since the Federal 
Reserve Act specifically underscores the goal of  full employment, we also assess 
whether, at certain times, the Fed focuses more on an employment gap.  
 
In a departure from the existing literature, we do not try to distinguish between long-
lasting monetary policy regimes (see, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1998; Fair 
2001; and Judd and Rudebusch 1998). Instead, our model allows the Fed’s priorities to 
vary continuously. It is therefore possible to assess the Fed’s priorities at any given time 
during  the Greenspan era. Further, our non-linear reaction function specification allows 
the Federal Reserve to react more agressively to inflation the more expected inflation   2 
diverges from an implicit target. Our specification takes into account the accepted idea 
that the Fed’s inflation mandate prevails over its economic activity mandate. Thus, we 
believe that, by moving away from a fixed-weight reaction function, our reaction function 
permits greater flexibility and may be more in line with how policy-makers actually set 
interest r ates in the United States.  We also contribute to the existing literature by 
empirically estimating the Fed’s focus over recent history. The resulting priority index 
could also help forecasters to determine which indicator is currently the most relevant to 
predict upcoming monetary policy decisions.  
 
Our results are intuitive and corroborated by historical evidence. Indeed, the monetary 
policy indexes show that the Fed’s focus was mainly on inflation over the first 10 years 
of Greenspan’s term as Fed chairman. Then, around 1998, economic activity became the 
Fed’s main focus. This is consistent with the increase in the Fed’s credibility over the 
Greenspan era. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The Federal Reserve Act specifies that the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) should seek “to promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
1  As the Fed 
recognizes, however, some tension can exist in the short run between efforts to reduce 
inflation and efforts to maximize employment and output. For instance, a significant 
increase in oil prices would require opposite monetary policy responses  to support 
employment and to reduce inflation.  
 
Taylor (1993) suggests a very simple rule for monetary policy. In this rule, the nominal 
federal funds rate responds to the equilibrium funds rate as well as the contemporaneous 
inflation gap and output gap.  The equilibrium funds rate is the interest rate at which 
demand and supply are equal in the long run and inflation is stable. While the output gap 
                                                 
1 The Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 affirms that the responsibility of the federal government is to 
promote “full employment and production . . . and reasonable price stability,” among other things.   3 
signals how far from full capacity the economy stands, it also adds a forward-looking 
dimension to the Taylor rule, since it is a good predictor of future inflation. According to 
Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor-type rules are “consistent with a policy regime in 
which the Fed attempts to control inflation in the long run and to smooth the amplitude of 
the business cycle in the short run.” Taylor (1993) does not estimate this policy rule. He 
imposes a weight of 1.5 on the inflation gap and 0.5 on the output gap.
2 Nevertheless, 
Taylor shows that this simple interest rate rule fits the data during the period 1987 to 
1992 reasonably well.  
 
Given the significant lags present in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy, an 
explicit forward-looking rule is more appropriate than a reaction function based on the 
contemporaneous inflation gap. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) claim that a forward-
looking rule should be a better fit for U.S. monetary policy, since it is consistent with 
how Fed policy-makers themselves describe monetary policy, as shown by the following 
remarks by Greenspan in 1997:  
 
. . . current conditions should not be seen as a basis for monetary policy, 
only as an indicator of whether inflationary pressures might be starting to 
build. . . . What the Federal Reserve will have to judge is not so much the 
question of where prices are or have been, but rather what is the state of 
the economy later this year and into 1998 when any actions we may or 
may not have taken would become effective. (Stevenson 1997) 
   
There are different ways to estimate an explicit forward-looking Taylor rule and account 
directly for the expected inflation. Côté et al. (2002) note, for example, that it is possible 
to include the forecast values for inflation that are taken from an economic model, or to 
use current values of variables that are believed to be good indicators of future inflation. 
In this paper, we choose to use the results of surveys on expected inflation.  
 
While most interest rate rules in the literature use some measure of the output gap, other 
indicators of economic activity  can be used. For example, Fair (2001) uses the 
                                                 
2 To achieve price stability, Taylor demonstrates that the inflation-gap coefficient should be greater than 
one.   4 
unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment rate, and finds that they have 
additional explanatory power. He concludes that the unemployment rate may be a better 
variable than the output gap in a reaction function.  It is therefore interesting to test 
whether, at different times in the business cycle, the Fed focuses more on the output gap 
(a very broad measure of economic activity) or the labour market. 
 
Overall, it appears that there have not been any great successes in modelling Fed 
behaviour with a single, stable reaction function. There are many reasons why a reaction 
function cannot explain policy actions over a very long period.  Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) note that a central bank reaction  function  may be too complex to be adequately 
captured by a simple linear regression. Changes in the composition of the FOMC can also 
modify the specification of a reaction function.  
 
As Hetzel (2000) explains, economists generally use the year 1980 as a dividing line 
between policies that failed to stabilize inflation and  those that  succeeded.  Indeed, 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) estimate reaction functions over different times and 
conclude that interest rate policies in the Volcker-Greenspan  era appear to have been 
much more sensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volcker era. Various 
authors,  however, refute such conclusions. One of the problems, according to Chang, 
Swamy, and Tavlas (2003), is that this methodology assumes that the dates at which the 
parameters of the fixed-coefficient have changed are known with certainty.  
  
Several studies also question the assumptions that the relationship between the interest 
rate and its determinants is linear and that the coefficients in this relationship are fixed. 
For instance, Chang, Swamy, and Tavlas (2003) believe that:  
 
. . . it would seem reasonable to allow for the possibility that the central 
bank adjusts the interest rate it controls more rapidly to a given gap 
between actual or expected inflation, and to the gap between actual and 
potential output, in light of the existing cyclical situation.  
 
   5 
2.1  Non-linear reaction function 
 
Linear reaction  functions are based on the assumption that the central bank has a 
quadratic loss function and that the Phillips curve is linear. Recent studies challenge both 
of  these assumptions. Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) abandon the assumption of a 
quadratic loss function and develop a theoretical model in which the weights given to 
inflation and output stabilization are not independent. In this framework, the central bank 
puts more weight  on  stabilizing output when inflation is low, but  more w eight  on 
inflation whenever inflation exceeds a certain threshold level.  
 
Kim, Osborn, and Sensier (2005) investigate the nature of any non-linearities in the 
central bank’s reaction function using a methodology  developed by Hamilton (2001). 
They find no evidence of non-linearity in U.S. monetary policy when data covering the 
period 1960–2000 are used. They find relatively strong evidence of non-linearity for the 
pre-Volcker era, but no such evidence  for the Volcker-Greenspan era. For the pre-
Volcker era, their results are consistent with recession aversion, in which policy-makers 
care more about decreases than increases in output. These results are in line with those 
obtained by Gerlach (2000). The Fed seems, however, more reactive to inflation 
deviations above target than below target.  
 
Bec, Ben Salem, and Collard (2002) test for the presence of asymmetries in the monetary 
policy reaction function with respect to inflation and output targets. They explore the 
possibility that the central bank reaction function depends on the state of the business 
cycle measured by the output gap.  Their results are consistent with an endogenously 
determined reaction function specification. The Fed seems to be more aggressive 
regarding an inflation gap during expansions than during recessions.  
 
In this paper, instead of testing parameter stability between successive FOMC chairman 
mandates, we focus only on the Greenspan  era to estimate monetary policy priority 
indexes. In this way, even if the Fed’s focus is allowed to alternate between different 
indicators, our assumption that most parameters are stable over the sample period is more   6 
plausible. To estimate the priority indexes, we use a non-linear reaction function in which 
the effective weights associated with the determinants are time-varying and endogenously 
determined. Contrary to Bec, Ben Salem, and Collard (2002), we assume that the central 
bank reaction function depends on the deviations of inflation from its targeted value, 
rather than on the output gap. This is broadly in line with the theoretical model developed 
by Orphanides and Wilcox (1996), since the Fed will put more weight on inflation when 
the deviations from the target are larger. However, while the Orphanides and Wilcox 
model is based on a certain inflation  threshold ( a  function of the policy-maker’s 
preferences), our reaction function allows the weight on inflation to increase with the 
inflation gap in a continuous manner.  
 
3.  Methodology 
 
We first assume a forward-looking reaction function that follows a simple Taylor-type 
rule. In  this specification,  the monetary authority can  react to both  an indicator of 
economic activity (in this case, either the output gap (y_gap) or the employment gap 
(emp_gap)) and the expected inflation gap (inf_gap) (see equation  (1)).
3,4 The inflation 
target is from Lalonde (2005), who identifies one historical shift over the period we 
consider.
5 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the expected inflation  gap (the difference 
between expected inflation,  based on surveys done by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, and the inflation target) over the Greenspan era. According to this inflation-
gap measure, inflation expectations have been well anchored around the inflation target 
only since the late 1990s. 
 
                                                 
3 The output gap used is derived from the methodology of Gosselin and Lalonde (2002). Their approach 
consists of H odrick-Prescott (HP)  filters to which an equilibrium path generated by a structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) is added as information conditioning the filter. The methodology used to calculate 
the equilibrium level of employment (necessary to derive the employment gap) is based on the same 
approach that combines an SVAR and an HP filter. Details are given in Appendix A. 
4 Our inflation measure is based on the GDP deflator. The inflation gap is the gap between inflation 
expected in the next four quarters (as captured in the survey done by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia—Survey of Professional Forecasters) and the target. This is similar to a year-over-year 
measure of inflation and therefore is less volatile than the annualized rate of change between two 
subsequent quarters. 
5 Lalonde (2005) uses a Bai-Perron test for endogenous structural breaks and identifies one break in 
1992Q4 in the core consumption deflator.   7 
 
 
Our base-case reaction function is: 
 
, _ _ 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 t t t t t gap y gap inf i i i ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + = + - - b b l l a     (1) 
 
where it is the nominal federal funds rate in period t and inf_gapt+4 represents the average 
of the expected inflation gap over the next  four quarters. Following the literature, the 
policy rule is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s preference for interest rate 
smoothing.
6 The nominal federal funds rate gradually converges to the Taylor-rule 
prescription. 
 
In the above reaction function, the weights attributed to each gap are fixed.  As with 
Chang, Swamy, and Tavlas (2003), we believe that this assumption is too strong, even if 
we consider a short period of time. In reality, the Fed’s priorities are probably highly 
dependent on economic circumstances. A reaction function  could therefore allow the 
weight attributed to the output gap and the inflation gap to vary over time. To account for 
a varying weight, we add a time-varying  monetary policy  priority index to the rule. 
                                                 
6 The literature provides different explanations for the preference for interest rate smoothing (see Srour  
2001), including the high degree of uncertainty around economic forecasts and the impact of interest rate 
decisions. Goodfriend (1991) discusses central banks’ fears of disrupting financial markets. 
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Therefore, we modify the base-case Taylor rule (equation (1)) to include the time-varying 
weights  t y and 1- t y  on the output gap and the inflation gap. Thus, at any given time, the 
Fed can decide to prioritize one of its two mandates ( price stability v ersus  full 
employment). The new reaction function is as follows: 
 
t t t t t t t gap y gap inf i i i _ ) ( _ ) 1 ( 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ - + ￿ + ￿ + = + - - b y b y l l a .    (2) 
 
In light of recent history and Fed communication,
7 we assume that price stability is the 
Federal Reserve’s ultimate goal, and that it will therefore examine the deviation of the 
expected inflation from the inflation target in order to determine the weight it places on 
this indicator.
8 As a result, the expected inflation gap is the decision variable. The further 
expected inflation is from the target, the greater the weight will be on the inflation gap (1-
y = 1). Alternatively, if expected inflation is right on target, the Fed will put no weight 
on the inflation gap and all the weight on the output gap (y = 1).  
 












t gap inf mave
t e           (3) 
 
The priority index, y  is distributed between 0 and 1, and follows a standardized normal 
functional form. This specification carries two main properties. First, the priority index is 
non-linear, so that small deviations have less of an impact on the index relative to larger 
ones. This is consistent with the Fed being able to tolerate small deviations from target, 
given its preference for smooth interest rate movements, and being able to account for 
possible measurement errors. Also, since higher deviations are likely to lead to some 
credibility loss, it is logical for the Fed to react in a non-linear way to deviations from the 
                                                 
7 See “Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions: Monetary Policy and the Economy,” on the Fed’s 
website at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm>. 
8 We use an eight-period moving average (mave) of the inflation gap. This way, Fed priorities will not 
change from inflation to economic activity (and vice versa) based on temporary movements in inflation.   9 
inflation target. Second, the priority index is symmetric. We therefore expect the Fed to 
adopt a similar strategy whether deviations from the target are positive or negative.  
 
Equation (3) shows that the priority index depends on the estimated coefficient,  1 q . This 
is a key coefficient: it determines, for any given deviation from the target, the speed at 
which  the Fed will reorient its priority from economic activity towards inflation. The 
smaller the  1 q , the greater the average weight will be on the expected inflation gap for a 
given period. Thus,  1 q  is inversely proportional to the Fed’s bias towards inflation. To 
illustrate the impact of  1 q , Figure 2 shows the weights attributed to the expected inflation 















In light of the previous example, consider the extreme case where  1 q  is very small. In this 
situation, the Fed would not tolerate any deviations of expected inflation from the target. 
Thus, 1 -y  will almost always  be  equal to 1 , and most, if not all, monetary policy 
decisions will be driven by the expected inflation gap. In this case, the output gap would 
be pertinent to monetary policy only when the expected inflation rate is on target.  
 
q = 0.003 
q = 0.006 
Figure 2: Priority Index and the Gap Between Inflation 














































































Figure 2: Priority Index and the Gap Between Inflation 
Expectations and the Target 
Expected inflation gap 
1 q = 0.003 
1 q = 0.006   10 
Given equations (2) and (3), we use the following specification for the reaction function 
that includes the priority index:  
 






















































q q b b l l a
(4) 
 
As with most Taylor rules, the output gap captures economic activity.
9 Depending on the 
circumstances,  however, it is  possible  for the Fed to focus on other indicators of 
economic activity. For example, since full employment is part of the Fed’s mandate, we 
believe that, on certain occasions, the Fed may have focused mainly on the labour market 
in making its policy decisions. Consider that, in 2003, U.S. economic growth appeared to 
be above its potential for several quarters, yet the Fed left interest rates at their historical 
low of 1 per cent until June 2004. Most analysts note that job creation was anemic over 
this period, despite the sustained economic growth. The Fed probably waited for some 
strengthening in the labour market before it started to raise rates.  
 
To take this assumption into account, we estimate a second reaction function in which, on 
top of the trade-off between inflation and economic activity, we let the Fed make either 
the output gap or the employment gap its priority. This should allow us to determine the 
weights that the Fed puts on these two indicators of economic activity. In this 













t gap inf mave













t gap emp mave
t e          (6) 
 
                                                 
9 Most researchers recognize, however, that the output gap suffers from different measurement problems 
(see, for example, Hetzel 2000).   11 
The inflation gap is the decision variable in the first priority index (see equation (5)). In 
this specification, however, the second priority index ( t 2 y ) allows the Fed to alternate 
priorities between the employment gap and the output gap (see equation (6)). In this case, 
we assume that the decision variable is the employment gap, since employment is directly 
referred to in the Federal Reserve Act. Also, this indicator may be more reliable, because 
employment is easier to measure than output. In this case,  2 q  is the key coefficient: it 
determines, for any given deviation of employment from its equilibrium level, the speed 
at which the Fed will reorient its priority from the output gap towards the employment 
gap. The smaller the  2 q , the greater the average weight will be on the employment gap 
for a given period.  2 q  is thus  inversely proportional to the Fed’s bias  for the labour 
market.  
 
The varying weight between the output gap and the employment gap is also distributed 
between 0 and 1 following a normal functional form. q  can, however, differ for the two 
sets of time-varying weights. We thus have: 
 




To provide a better idea of what this reaction function implies, Figure 3 illustrates the Fed 
decision process.  
 
   12 
Figure 3: The Federal Reserve Decision Process 
 
First, the Fed  considers the expected inflation gap and, given  1 q   (its bias towards 
inflation), attributes a weight to the expected inflation gap and economic activity. The 
Fed  then  observes the employment gap and, given  2 q   (its bias towards  maximum 
employment), attributes a weight to the employment gap and the output gap. Note that 
this is a simplification; in reality, everything is estimated simultaneously. 
 
4.  Estimation Procedures 
 
We use two different approaches to estimate the non-linear Taylor-type rules. First, we 
estimate the reaction functions with non-linear least squares using the generalized method 
of moments ( GMM) to address  potential simultaneity bias  (the federal funds rate 
responds to output and expected inflation, but also affects these variables).
10 Second, to 
test for the robustness of the results, we use a grid search as an alternative method of 
                                                 
10 Our instrument sets for the GMM include a constant and four lags of the following variables: nominal 
federal funds rate, inflation, the inflation gap, and the output gap.  
Given the inflation 
gap and 1 q  
 
weight on the inflation 
gap:  ) 1 ( 1t y -  
weight on economic 
activity:  ) ( 1t y  
Given the employment 
gap and  2 q  
weight on the employment 
gap:  ) 1 ( 2t y -   
weight on the output 
gap:  ) ( 2t y    13 
estimation. Given  the specification of the reaction function, q  cannot be equal to zero. 
Thus, we use the grid search to find the value of q  that minimizes the root mean squared 
errors (RMSE) of the regressions. Specifically, we impose values for q  (starting  with 
values very close to zero), estimate the reaction functions for each  q , and select the one 
that minimizes the RMSE.  
 
5.  Results 
 
For comparison purposes, we first estimate equation (1), the linear Taylor-type rule with 
a fixed weight (Table 1, case A). Parameters  2 1 2 1 and , , , , b b l l a  are estimated. In the 
base-case reaction function, all the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant. 
As found in the literature, the coefficient on inflation is significantly higher (about three 
times the size) than the coefficient associated with the output gap. The sum of the two 
smoothing parameters equals 0.91, which shows that the Federal Reserve has a strong 
preference for interest rate smoothing.  
 
Table 1: Estimation Results (1987Q3 to 2004Q4) 
  Estimation 
procedure  a
  1 l   2 l   1 b   2 b   1 q   RMSE 




(6.99)  (28.85)  (-10.20)  (7.37)  (5.52)     




(8.01)  (18.06)  (-6.79)  (5.37)  (5.06)  (5.50)   




(4.22)  (13.07)  (-4.85)  (4.80)  (4.50)  (4.53)   




and GMM)  (8.12)  (18.69)  (-7.16)  (5.74)  (6.21)     
0.0039  1.286  -0.419  0.609  0.189  0.0027   0.00293 
E 
Equation (4): 
(grid search  
no GMM)  (4.23)  (12.98)  (-4.82)  (4.70)  (4.57)     
 
Note: The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
   14 
 
Equation (4) includes the monetary policy priority indexes that allow the Fed to alternate 
its priority  between  the  expected inflation gap and the output gap. P arameters 
1 2 , 1 2 1 and , , , , q b b l l a  are estimated. Table 1 (cases B, C, D, and E) shows the results of 
equation  (4) based on  the  different estimation procedures.
11  In all cases, w hile 
2 1 and , , l l a remain roughly in line with the results from equation (1), the coefficients on 
the expected inflation gap and the output gap have both increased significantly. Indeed, 
the coefficient associated with inflation almost doubles in size when the priority index is 
taken into account. This is expected, since both parameters are multiplied by the priority 
indexes, which vary between 0 and 1.  
 
We will use the results from case D estimated with GMM, since the grid search improves 
the fit  relative to the simple non-linear least squares.  To be able to compare the 
coefficient from equation  (1)  with those  from  equation  (4), we calculate the average 
“effective” coefficient for inflation ( 1 ) 1 ( b y ￿ - t ) and for the output gap ( 2 b y ￿ ￿ t ). These 
effective coefficients are, respectively, 0.418 (compared with 0.375 in equation (1)) and 
0.06 (compared with 0.096 in equation (1)). Over the whole sample, it seems that the Fed 
might have, on average, put more weight on the inflation gap than what is normally 
assumed when estimating the fixed-weight reaction function. However, the difference in 
the estimated coefficient is not very large. 
 
The coefficient associated with the monetary policy priority index ( 1 q ) is statistically 
significant, being around 0.0030 (although we estimate  1 q  using a grid search, we can 
deduce that the coefficient is significant because we get nearly the same result for  1 q  
even without using the grid search, as shown in Case B). Figure 4 illustrates how the 
monetary policy priority index varies with the expected inflation gap when  1 q equals 
0.0030. Our estimates show  that, as long  as deviations of inflation expectations  from 
target are less than 0.4 percentage points, the Fed will put more weight on the output gap 
than on the inflation gap. When expected inflation deviates persistently from its target by 
                                                 
11 It is important to note that none of the coefficients is very sensitive to the use of GMM.    15 
more than a full percentage point, however, the weight on inflation approaches 1. On 
those occasions, the Fed will focus almost exclusively on the expected inflation gap when 





Figure 4: Priority Indices and the Gap Between Inflation 


















































































These results are intuitive and corroborated by historical evidence. Keep in mind that our 
inflation measure is based on the GDP deflator, which is more volatile than core 
measures of inflation. Given the volatility of this measure, the Fed does not react to high-
frequency movements.  Therefore, the Fed would possibly  have a lower tolerance for 
deviations of core measures of inflation, such as the core CPI or the price index for core 
personal consumption expenditures. On the other hand, we use an eight-period moving 
average of the inflation gap to reduce its volatility. The coefficient  1 q  could be affected 
by this, since a smoother expected inflation gap should correspond to a smaller  1 q . We 
re-estimate the equation with a more volatile four-period moving average of the inflation 
gap. As a result,  1 q  increases from 0.0030 to 0.0033. 
 
Weight on the 
inflation gap 
Weight on the 
output gap 
Figure 4: Priority Indexes and the Gap Between Inflation 
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Figure 5  shows how the weight on the  expected  inflation gap and the output gap 
fluctuated over the past 15 years based on equation (4). The Fed seems to have put much 
more weight on inflation in the first 10 years of the Greenspan era. Then, around 1998, 
inflation seems to have become less of a concern for the Fed. The output gap seems to 
have been the main determinant of monetary policy over the past five years. This result 
does not imply that inflation is not a concern for the Fed, since the output gap remains a 
leading indicator of inflation. Moreover, under this framework, the Fed will put more 




The behaviour of the monetary policy indexes is intuitive. A t the beginning of  the 
Greenspan era, inflation expectations were significantly higher than the observed level of 
inflation and the target (Figure 1). Therefore, the interest rate level  was set to increase 
Fed credibility and bring inflation expectations closer to the target. This is consistent with 
the results of Lalonde (2005), who finds empirical evidence that credibility increased 
significantly over the Greenspan  era.  In fact,  according  to Lalonde’s results,  from 
1987Q3–1996Q4 to 1997Q1–2003Q4, credibility increased by 25 per cent. Figure 5 also 
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shows that, immediately following the 1990–91 recession, the Fed’s focus on the output 
gap increased temporarily. This situation lasted until mid-1993, when the Fed’s priorities 
moved back to inflation.
12 This behaviour is consistent with the Fed’s dual mandate. 
Since 1999, inflation expectations have stabilized and become well anchored around the 
target. As expected, the priority indexes show that, over the more recent period, the Fed 
focused mostly on the output gap. This implies that the deviation of inflation expectations 
from the target were sufficiently small and short-lived to be ignored by the Fed.  
 
Over the recent period (mostly in 2004), the financial community raised concerns about 
the risk of possible deflation. It could therefore seem surprising to see that the Fed’s 
focus remained constantly on the output gap over that period. One should not interpret 
this result as a signal that inflation has not mattered over the recent period. Given that the 
output gap and the employment gap are good predictors of future inflation, the fact that 
the Federal Reserve left rates unchanged at 1 per cent to support output growth is not 
inconsistent with the fear of deflation. This suggests that the Fed does not target inflation 
per se, but does what it takes to close the output gap and make sure  that  inflation 
expectations do not fall significantly below the implicit target.  
 
5.1  The employment gap 
 
The Federal Reserve Act specifically notes the goal of maximum employment. We wish 
to test whether, on certain occasions, the Federal Reserve directly targets employment. 
To perform this test, an employment gap is included in the reaction function (equation 
(7)).
13 In this specification, the Fed can decide to focus on the expected inflation gap, the 
output gap, or the employment gap. 
 
We base our employment gap on non-farm employment, using the monthly survey 
of the payroll records of business establishments  (from the Bureau of Labor 
                                                 
12 The dramatic change in Fed priorities over this period is partly due to the choice of a discrete change in 
the inflation target  in 1992Q4. If we allow the inflation target to change in a more gradual manner, 
however, the change in Fed priorities remains and is only marginally smoother.  
13 Appendix A describes the methodology used to derive the equilibrium level of employment.   18 
Statistics). Figure 6  shows how the employment gap and the output gap evolved 




As expected, these two indicators follow each other closely. This result implies that most 
fluctuations in the output gap are driven by fluctuations in the labour input. To verify 
whether the Federal Reserve can rely on either of these two measures, w e re-estimate 
equation  (4) by replacing the output gap with the employment gap. As Table 2 
demonstrates, the results are comparable, implying that the Fed would derive a similar 
message from either indicator. The RMSE is, however, slightly lower in the case of the 
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87Q1 88Q1 89Q1 90Q1 91Q1 92Q1 93Q1 94Q1 95Q1 96Q1 97Q1 98Q1 99Q1 00Q1 01Q1 0 2Q1 03Q1 04Q1    19 
Table 2: Output Gap vs. Employment Gap (1987Q3 to 2004Q4) 
  a
  1 l   2 l   1 b   2 b   1 q   RMSE 
0.0045  1.262  -0.402  0.580  0.216  0.0030  0.00295  Equation (4) 
(output gap) 
(8.12)  (18.69)  (-7.16)  (5.74)  (6.21)     
0.0028  1.485  -0.567  0.272  0.109  0.0022  0.00316  Equation (4) 
(employment 
gap)  (3.20)  (24.29)  (-11.16)  (4.56)  (1.71)     
 
 
Figure 6  shows that  the employment gap lags the output gap and is somewhat less 
volatile. Further, some periods show more divergence between the two indicators. In the 
late 1990s, for example, the increase in the output gap was not followed by a proportional 
increase in the employment gap. This highlights the fact that economic growth over this 
period was supported mostly by an increase in the labour-productivity gap. But is there 
enough complementary information in these two measures of economic activity to make 
the Fed want to focus on both measures? To answer this question, we estimate equation 
(7), in which there is a trade-off between inflation and economic activity, and a second 
trade-off between the two measures of economic activity. 
 
In equation (7), parameters  , , , , , , , 1 3 2 1 2 1 q b b b l l a  and  2 q  are estimated. Table 3 reports 
the results. Interestingly, whichever estimation procedure is used, the coefficient of the 
employment gap (i.e.,  3 b ) is never significant. We therefore conclude that, while the Fed 
can focus on either measure of economic activity, the employment gap does not add any 
new information.  
 
Table 3: Output Gap and Employment Gap (1987Q3 to 2004Q4) 
  a
  1 l   2 l   1 b   2 b   3 b  
1 q   2 q   RMSE 
0.0027  1.256  -0.375  0.648  0.276  0.001  0.0027  0.013  0.00290  Equation (7) 
(no GMM) 
(2.16)  (12.74)  (-4.44)  (4.94)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (4.11)  (2.06)   
 
   20 
6.  Robustness Analysis 
 
As a final step, we conduct several robustness tests to make sure that our results are not 
too sensitive to some base-case assumptions. First, the assumption of a constant neutral 
interest rate may be too strong. In theory, the equilibrium short-term interest rate varies, 
being influenced by, for example, productivity and inflation expectations. To test whether 
our results are sensitive to the assumption of a constant neutral interest rate, we re-
estimate equation (4) by  imposing a time-varying neutral interest rate, which is derived 
from  an HP filter applied to the historical  nominal federal funds rate. Our results are 
robust to this change. Moreover, the importance of the smoothing parameter in the HP 
filter does not change the priority index, and therefore the conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
The second robustness test that we perform  aims to confront the fixed-weight 
specification (equation (1)) against the time-varying weight specification. To do so, we 


















































In this specification, we allow for the same time-varying weight as in equation (4), but 
we  also  allow  for a fixed weight (i.e.,  z b ￿ 2 ) on the output gap. This version of 
equation (4)  incorporates equation  (1), because if the coefficient  1 q   is close to 0, the 
weight on the inflation becomes  [ ] 0 1 1 - b , which is the equivalent of a fixed weight, and 
the weight on the output gap is also fixed (i.e.,  [ ] 0 2 + z b ). We use a grid search to select 
which combination of  2 b  and  z  minimizes the RMSE, estimating the other parameters 
for every combination. This new version of  equation (4) is difficult to estimate. In fact,   21 
we do not have any success using GMM, but the non-linear least-squares estimation 
shows that  1 q  is statistically significant and equal to 0.0026 (compared with 0.0030 for 
equation (4)). Furthermore, the fixed weight  z b ￿ 2 on the output gap is very small (i.e., 
0.02) and statistically insignificant, because z  is statistically no different than 0. Finally, 
2 b is equal to 0.18 (compared with 0.189 for equation (4)) and statistically significant. 
These results give some indication that variable weights could be preferable to  fixed 
weights, but further work needs to be done on this issue.  
 
Finally, we test whether our results are sensitive to the sample period, by increasing the 
sample to include the last five years of the  Volcker  era (making the sample period 
thereby span  from 1983Q1 to 2004Q4).
14 The priority index shows that, from 1983 to 
1986, the Federal Reserve put almost all the weight on inflation. This result is intuitive. 
Over the Greenspan era, the priority index evolves almost exactly the way it does when 
estimated over the shorter sample. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Most studies that are interested in parameter stability  in Taylor-type rules try to 
distinguish between long-lasting monetary policy regimes that are defined by the terms of 
Fed chairmen. Our base assumption is that the weights put on different indicators by the 
Fed  depend on  economic circumstances and should therefore  vary  even within a 
chairman’s  mandate.  As a result, in  this paper we estimate monetary policy priority 
indexes that capture the Fed’s main priorities when they make monetary policy decisions. 
 
Our results from the reaction function in which non-linear endogenous weights are 
included confirm our expectations. Over the first 10 years of the Greenspan era, the Fed’s 
focus was mainly on inflation. Over that period, inflation expectations were not well 
anchored. T o build credibility, the Federal Reserve had to be more aggressive  with 
regards to inflation. Since the late 1990s, inflation expectations have been well anchored. 
                                                 
14 1983Q1 corresponds to a second break in the inflation target.   22 
Therefore, as our results show, over the past five years the Fed has acted mainly to 
smooth the economic cycle. Our results suggest also that, although the employment gap 
is a good proxy for the output gap in a reaction function, it does not add new information.  
 
Different extensions of this work are possible. First, methods other than the Bai-Perron 
test for endogenous structural breaks could be used to identify the historical inflation 
targets. Second, statistical distributions other than the normal distribution could be used 
for the time-varying weight in the reaction function. An asymmetrical distribution could 
indeed be more suitable, given that the risk of deflation possibly requires more aggressive 
reactions from policy-makers than a positive increase in inflation.    23 
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Appendix A: The Employment Gap 
 
To estimate the equilibrium level of employment, we use an extended multivariate 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to which an equilibrium path generated by an SVAR is added as 
information conditioning the estimate.  This method generates an equilibrium that is 
smoother than that given by an SVAR while reducing end-of-sample problems inherent 
in filters (see Gosselin  and Lalonde 2002). Using Monte Carlo simulations, Rennison 
(2003) shows that this approach adequately reproduces the output gap from the data-
generation process (a model economy), for a wide variety of specifications of the 
process’s parameters. The SVAR approach, based on the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
decomposition, identifies trends in the variables of a VAR by imposing restrictions on the 
long-term impacts of structural shocks. The variable of interest (in this case, 
employment) should be separable into permanent and temporary components.  
 
A.1  Specification of the SVAR 
 
In addition to the change in the level of employment, we include four variables in the 
SVAR: (i) a nominal variable (the index for compensation per hour), in order to allow the 
model to distinguish between nominal and real variations, and therefore between supply 
and demand shocks; (ii) the real federal funds rate, to account for the impact of monetary 
policy; (iii) the real yield on 10-year government bonds, to capture other types of demand 
shocks; and (iv) the change in non-farm production (output), to capture the links between 
the economic cycle and those of employment.  
 
This specification is very similar to, and therefore compatible with, the one used in the 
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